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Abstract
T h is paper gives guidelines to  antitrust lawyers in a case of 
alleged tacit collusion on how to report dem and and cost parame­
ters such th a t a collusive outcom e becom es ind istinguishable from 
a C ournot outcom e. It d iscusses both  jo int profit m axim ising out­
com es and less extrem e collusive outcom es. In particular, it shows 
w h at degree of collusion can be m ade ind istinguishable  when the 
an titru st authority knows th a t the true param eters m ust lie below  
som e upper bounds.
’ Correspondence to Louis Phlips, European University Institute, 50016 San 





















































































































































































1 In trod u ction
In the 1996 Papers and Proceedings of the European Economic Review, 
Phlips’ presidential address included a table giving ’’The Ten Command­
ments” for the defense to follow in an antitrust proceeding. The as­
sumption is that an antitrust authority (in the following simply termed 
’’authority”) has initiated a proceeding against a group of firms, alleging 
tacit collusion, that is, a collusive outcome sustained as an equilibrium 
of a noncooperative repeated game. The firms defend themselves by re­
porting information about demand and cost of production. Since the 
authority is at an informational disadvantage, the firms under attack 
can report incorrect values such that the observed prices and production 
quantities appear as resulting from competitive behaviour. We assume 
that the authority acknowledges that in a market with a small number 
of firms ’’competition” is not equivalent to ’’price equal marginal cost”, 
but accepts that the firms have positive equilibrium profits as is the 
case in the noncooperative one-shot equilibrium of the Cournot model of 
oligopoly.
The ” Commandments” suggest that the defense should exaggerate 
the level of demand, the inelasticity of demand and the marginal cost of 
production. Suppose that the intercept, the slope (of the inverse demand 
function) and constant marginal cost are the only three parameters to 
report. It should be clear that the defense should not blindly follow the 
Commandments and always over-report all three parameters. There is an 
economic logic to be followed: the reported parameter values should be 
compatible with the observed prices and quantities and with the demand 
and cost functions. There is also an algebraic constraint: the parameter 
values to report are found by solving a system of only two equations (one 
defining the quantity and one defining the price), so that there is one 
degree of freedom.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify this logic (by showing which 
false reports are compatible with each other) and thus to give clear guide­
lines to antitrust lawyers who have to decide which defense strategy to 



























































































ity has no means to verify whether the firms are actually colluding or 
not, and whether the reported parameter values are the true ones. This 
means that in our model the authority cannot prove that the firms are 
colluding, but instead can check whether the reports are consistent with 
its own information and the price and quantities observed in the market. 
We assume that the amount of the authority’s information is common 
knowledge.
In the existing literature on this topic it is usually assumed that 
the authority checks for collusion with a certain probability, and when 
it does it is always able to identify collusion with certainty. There the 
demand function is common knowledge, and the cost of production can 
be exactly determined once the proceeding has started (see for example 
Besanko and Spulber (1989) and Friedman, Jehiel and Thisse (1995)).
We do not take into consideration the possibility of ’’cheating’’ by 
cartel members, that is deviating from the (tacit) agreement. Rather, 
we want to delineate how much collusion is possible if cheating can be 
ruled out. Thus, our results yield upper limits for the possible outcomes 
that can be reached through repeated play, as in Friedman (1971,1977), 
where the collusion is enforced by possible future punishment.
In Section 2, we consider the extreme case of a collusive outcome 
with joint profit maximisation implying the monopoly outcome. We de­
note this case full collusion. This was the assumption adopted in the 
initial paper by Harstad and Phlips (1994), from which most of the Ten 
Commandments follow. We find that if the authority does not know 
any of the parameters, the firms can choose between different possible 
reports that ensure that no proof of collusion is possible. However, we 
argue that overreporting all parameters seems to be preferable to overre­
porting some of the parameters and underreporting the remaining ones. 
If the authority knows one of the demand parameters, the firms have 
no choice but to report the remaining demand parameter truthfully and 
exaggerate the cost of production. If instead the cost is known, both 
demand parameters must be overstated. In the latter two cases collu­
sion can be made indistinguishable even though the authority has some 




























































































demand parameters, it has conclusive evidence of collusion.
In Section 3, the defense strategies obtained under full joint profit 
maximisation are reconsidered, allowing for less extreme forms of tacit 
collusion. Here a market outcome that is intermediate between full col­
lusion and Cournot competitionis is supposed to be given. We call this 
partial collusion. We show that a) the qualitative guidelines (which pa­
rameters to over-report in various cases) do not change with the degree of 
collusion but b) the numerical values to report increase with the degree 
of collusion.
In Section 4, firms choose the maximum degree of collusion com­
patible with the fact that the antitrust authority is somewhat better 
informed and knows that the true parameter values must lie below some 
upper bounds. If these bounds are large compared to the true values, 
then the monopoly outcome can be achieved .
2 R ep o rts  under F ull C ollu sion .
2.1 T h e  M odel
Let the inverse demand function be given by p = a — bQ, where p is 
the market price, a is the demand intercept, b is its slope, which gives a 
measure of the elasticity of the demand, and Q is the aggregate output 
of the industry. The form of this inverse demand function is common 
knowledge. The firms know the parameters a and 6, but the authority 
may not.
We assume that the industry is composed of n identical firms with 
constant marginal costs c (c. < a) and no fixed costs; these firms follow 
quantity strategies.
Joint profit maximisation leads to pJ — ~~  and aggregate output 
QJ =  , which assigns to each single firm the quantity qJ =
On the other hand, in Cournot competition each firm produces 




























































































Suppose n =  3, a — 14, 6 =  2, c =  10, so that the Cournot price 
is pc =  11, the monopoly price is pJ =  12. Production quantities for 
each firm are given by (f — 0.5 and qJ =  0.33. Aggregate quantities are 
Qc = 1.5 and QJ — 1. We will use this example throughout the paper to 
illustrate our results.
The antitrust authority wants the firms to compete which we inter­
pret as engaging in Cournot competition. If the authority suspects that 
the firms are colluding, it will ask them to report demand and cost pa­
rameters to check whether the market price is too high and the quantities 
are too small as one would find under collusion. If the firms are actually 
colluding they will want to report demand parameters 2, b and marginal 
cost c such that the price pJ and the quantities qJ seem to result from 
Cournot competition:
Pj
2 +  nc 
n + 1 ( 1)
9j
2 — c 
b(n +  1) ( 2)
The following analysis demonstrates what the firms should report in the 
cases where the authority has different amounts of information about the 
parameters.
2.2 T h e  A u th o r ity  has no In form ation
In this case, given conditions (1) and (2), and the three parameters to 
report, the problem amounts to solving a system of two equations in 
three unknowns, which leaves the firm with one degree of freedom. In 
other words, one parameter value can be chosen freely and the other two 
must then be calculated using that value. So the values to report are (for 
proofs see the appendix): Choose 2 and
6 =  6 -
a — pJ
=  6 1 + 2 -




























































































(n +  l)pJ — a (n -  \)(a -  c) + 2(a -  a)
c = ----------------- = c + --------------------------------- (4,
n In
where a is chosen freely. Given the value of a, there are three possibilities:
• a > a: Here b must always be overstated and c as well if the 
reported a is not too large:
\
> <
b > b and c < > c if a ■ _
< l > .
a — a : b = b and
a < a : b < b and
w
a + ( n -  l ) 2̂ (ii)
(iii)
c > c (iv
c > c (v
Possible reports sustaining the monopoly price and quantity in these five 
cases are:
a b c
(i) 16 4 10.67
(ii) 18 6 10
(iii) 20 8 9.33
(iv) 14 2 11.33
(v) 13 1 11.67
Although all these five possibilities lead to the desired indistinguishabil- 
ity, the choices (iii) and (v) are not to be recommended: If (v) is compared 
to (iv), we see that in (v) the defense must overreport cost more than in 
(iv) to compensate for the underreported demand parameters. In (iii), 
the defense has to underreport cost to compensate for the exaggerated 
report of the demand intercept. The intuition is that in general it is 
advisable not to report values that are too extreme, because they will 
be more likely to raise suspicions that exaggerated parameter values are 
being reported. Moreover, underreporting of parameters today will con­




























































































The values to report are:
2.3 T h e  A u th ority  know s th e  M arginal Cost
a — a +  (n — 1)
b — nb
Clearly, the defense has to overstate a and b. From the above example 
we have a — 18, b =  6 and c =  c =  10.
2 .4  T h e  A u th ority  know s at least one D em and Pa­
ram eter
The values to report are:
6 =  6
„  (n — l)a  +  (n +  l)c  
C=: 2n '
If the authority knows one demand parameter the firms have to report the 
other one truthfully! But since they are charging the monopoly price and 
not the Cournot price, some parameter must be overstated, and in this 
case the only one left is cost c. This means that the antitrust authority 
will not be able to detect collusion if it does not know anything about 
production cost. From the above example we have a = a = 14, 6 =  6 =  2 




























































































2.5 T h e  A u th ority  knows th e  M arginal C ost and  
on e D em and Param eter
The defense has to report the true value for the remaining unknown 
parameter:
a =  a b — b c — c.
There is no point in reporting the unknown demand parameter incor­
rectly, since the antitrust authority can compute its true value using the 
value of the known demand parameter. In this case no undetectable col­
lusion is possible, i.e. there is no indistinguishability: tacit collusion can 
easily be detected by comparing the observed prices and quantities to 
the values they should obtain in a competitive Cournot equilibrium. As 
shown above, the authority can only compute these values if it knows 
the true values of all parameters. In our example, a — a = 14, b = b = 2 
and c =  c =  10.
3 R ep o r ts  under P artia l C ollusion
In the previous section we considered the full joint profit maximising 
outcome. Now we relax this assumption, allowing firms to collude to a 
lesser degree that is considered to be given (we will look at choosing the 
degree of collusion in the next section). Indeed, the authority may be 
better informed than assumed up to this point, and then full collusion 
may not be possible. This section sets the stage for Section 4, where 
we assume that the authority knows some upper bounds that the true 
parameter values cannot exceed. Obviously, in most of the following 
cases full collusion would be optimal; but the aim of this analysis is to 
derive the formulas needed in Section 4.
We use a rough measure of collusion by indexing the level of prices 
using a parameter (3 E [0,1]. For given j3, the resulting price p is given 
by




























































































i.e. p lies between the Cournot price and the monopoly price. Note that
P — 0 p = pc (6)
0  =  1 <=> P =  PJ ■ ( " )
For our numerical example we get p =  (1 — p)( l l )  + P(12) — p  +  11 and 
q — (1 — P)(0.5) +  p(0.33) =  0.5 — 0.167p. In the following we will use 
p — 0.5, leading to p — 11.5 and q =  .417.
For a given price p we can compute the degree of collusion p from
P = P ~ P C pJ _  pc ( 8 )
Note also that since p =  a — bnq is linear in p and q, for p = (1 — p)pc + 
PpJwe can derive the quantity that is produced by each firm as
q = (1 -  P)qc + PqJ , (9)
so that the degree of collusion given by the value of p does not depend on 
whether we measure collusion in terms of prices or quantities. We now 
give the results for the cases that are analogous to the previous section.
3.1 T he A u th ority  has no Inform ation
If the authority does not know a single true value and the price is given 
by p = (1 — P)pc + PpJ for some fixed value of P. then the firms should 
report some a > a and
b b ^  
a — p
(n +  l)p -  a 
n
2 (n + l) (a - ff l)  \
[2n -  P(n -  l)](a -  c))  '




The demand slope b should be exaggerated, and also the cost report c 
if a is not too large (the critical value is a =  a + P(n — l ) 2̂ ) .  It is 
straightforward to verify that the cases (i) to (v) from above hold again. 




























































































3.2 T h e A uth ority  know s th e  M arginal Cost
The values to report are c = c and
a a +  / ? ( n - l ) ~ (12)
l  -  2 +  P(n ~ !) _  ^2n -  fin + [3n2
2n — f3(n — 1) 2n — (3n + 0
(13)
It is clear that the firms have to overstate both demand parameters if 
they are colluding. Reporting a =  16, b =  3.6, c =  c = 10, ensures 
indistinguishability.
3.3 T h e  A u th ority  know s a t least one D em an d  P a ­
ram eter
The values to report are:
a = a 6 = 6, (14)
, 0(n ~ !)(a -  c) 
C =  C + --------2 Ï--------
(15)
As before, if the authority knows one demand parameter the firms have 
to report the other one truthfully. Cost has to be overstated to obtain 
indistinguishability. The defense should report 2 =  a =  14, b — b — 2, 
c =  10.67.
3.4 T h e  A uth ority  know s th e  M arginal C ost and  
one D em and P aram eter
The defense must report the true value for the remaining unknown de­
mand parameter:




























































































This result is rather strong.Even partial collusion, however small, cannot 
be hidden by false reports! The firms have no other choice but to engage 
in Cournot competition, and counsel should realise that pleading ’’not 
guilty” is hopeless.
4 M axim u m  In d istin g u ish a b le  C ollusion
4.1 T h e  F irm s’ P rob lem
In this section we will assume that the authority knows that the true 
values of the demand and cost parameters lie below some fixed upper 
bounds, and that this fact and the values of the bounds are common 
knowledge. It is clear that the reported parameter values should not 
exceed these bounds, since such a report would be an obvious sign of 
collusion. On the other hand, if the bounds are close to the true values, 
full joint profit maximization will no longer be feasible, and only some 
degree of partial collusion can be achieved.
We are ignoring lower bounds since we concluded in Section 2 that 
there is no incentive for the firms to underreport any of the parameters. 
The firms’ reports then have to satisfy the following bounds:
a < a# b < bfi c < Cfj, (17)
where the subscript H stands for upper bound. We assume that the 
authority’s bounds are never smaller than the true values of a, b, and c. 
Note that the analysis of the preceding sections can be incorporated in 
this setting by assuming that if the authority actually knows the value of 
some parameter, the ’’upper bound” is the true value of that parameter. 
If for example the authority knows a, this is equivalent to imposing the 
upper bound a# =  a.
The firms face the following optimisation problem: find the degree 
of collusion that maximises individual profits and ensures indistinguisha- 
bility conditional on the given bounds. At the optimum firms choose the 




























































































• r J a +  c <p =  mm{p =  ——  ,p
aH + n.CH b bHa + nbcn
= - ^ T  =  t „ + n t >' (18)
The optimal price is the highest price that is feasible, which means that 
the firms have to choose the smallest one out of {pJ,pa,pb}- This is 
because, given the bounds, the firms may not be able to collude as much 
as they want to. The choice of price depends on whether the authority's 
bounds are so high that they are not affecting collusion, or whether they 
are so low that the firms cannot report arbitrarily high values.
• Case 1: p =  pJ : This is the monopoly price and thus the price 
chosen by the firms under joint profit maximisation if the bounds 
given by the authority are very high. In this respect, this case 
clearly coincides with the case without bounds. Still, the reported 
a will have to be in a range given by
max{a, (n + 1)° ^  — ncH} < a < min{aw, a + (—
(19)
since the choice of values is restricted (see the figure for case 1). 
The reports b and c are computed from the chosen a using the 
formulas from above:
b = b
a — p 
a — pJ
„ _  (n +  l)pJ -  a 
n
Continuing our numerical example, suppose that an =  15, 6# =  3, 
and Ch — 12. We obtain pJ — 12, pa = 12.75 and pb = 12.67, such 
that the firms will be able to charge the monopoly price.
• Case 2: p =  pa : This price will be charged when counsel cannot 
do any better than report values for a and c that coincide with 
the upper bounds. This means that the constraints on a and c are 
binding whereas the constraint on b is not (see the figure for case 




























































































a =  aH, c = c„, (20)
g b n(aH -  cH) __b(n + l)aH - a H - n c H 
(n + \)a — an — ncH (n + l)a — an — ncn
where the last expression makes it clear that b > b if an > a.
If we assume that an =  15, bn =  3, and Cn =  10, we obtain 
pJ — 12, pa — 11.25 and pb =  11.33. In this case the low bounds 
on cost (this bound is actually the true value) and the demand 
intercept prevent the firms from colluding fully. Compare this with 
Section 2.3 and note that the bound on the demand slope, though 
also low, does not matter since the bound on the demand intercept 
is ’’tighter”.
• Case 3: p = pb : This price will be charged when at the optimum 
the constraints on b and c are binding whereas the constraint on a 
is not (see the figure for case 3). The firms will report:
(n + l)abH -  n(bH - b ) c H . n(bH -  b)(a -  cH)a = ------------:-------- :------------ =  a H----------7--------7------ , (11)
bn + nb bn + nb
b = bH, c - c H. (23)
The reported a will be larger than a.
Suppose that an — 15, bn = 2, and cn = 11, we obtain pJ — 12, 
pa =  12 and pb — 11.75. Here the firms will only be able to charge
4 .2  T h e  M axim u m  D eg ree  o f C ollusion
Now we can compute the maximum degree of collusion that is indis­
tinguishable from non-cooperative behaviour. To do this we take into 




























































































optimal prices. This will provide us with a measure of how high collusion 
is in every case. Remember that the degree of collusion was defined by
/? =
P ~ P C
pJ — pc
Thus, substituting the optimal prices from (18) we get, respectively: 
Case 1: p — pJ — ^  :
0 =  1. (24)
Of course, if the firms charge the monopoly price we have full collusion. 
Case 2: p = pa = a“̂ “ :
R -  o (aH ~ a) + n{c„ -  c)
P (n — l)(a — c) '
In our example, we obtain /? =  0.25. 
Case 3: p =  p> =  * * % £ * :
(bH -  b)a +  nb(cH -  c) +  (bcH -  bHc) 
(n -  l)(a -  c)(bH +  nb) (26)
Here the example leads to (3 = 0.75.
The interpretation of these values is that in cases 2 and 3 only 
partial collusion can be made indistinguishable. We can see from expres­
sions (25) and (26) that the closer the bounds are to the true values, the 
smaller the resulting degree of collusion will be.
A  Jo in t P ro fit M ax im isa tion  under a given  
D eg ree  o f C ollusion
In this appendix we derive the reports ensuring indistinguishability for 
arbitrary f3 G [0,1]. The case of full profit maximisation at the monopoly 




























































































formulas where the authority knows nothing and then specialize them to 
the cases where the authority has some information about true values of 
cost and/or demand parameters.
For a fixed degree of collusion 3 the firms choose a price p between 
the monopoly and the Cournot price, and determine the individual quan­
tities q from the demand function:
P =  (1 “  P)PC + PpJ =
9 =
To insure indistinguishability, the firms must report a set of parameter 
values (2, b, c) such that p and q appear as Cournot price and quantity, 
respectively:
-  P ) - r r ¥  + 0 - + Cn + 1
(27)
a — p 
nb
P  =
a + nc 
n +  1
2 — c 
b(n + 1)
(28)
Since (28) is a system of two equations in three unknowns (2, b, c) we can 
choose an arbitrary value for 2 and solve for b and c:




(n +  l)p -  2
=  c +
2(n + l ) ( 2 - a )  \  
[2n -  0(n -  l)](a -  c) )  ’
(29)
2 (a — 2) +  /3(n — l)(a — c) 
2 n (30)
From (29) we see that the relationship between 2 and b is monotonically 
increasing. Note that b — b if and only if 2 =  a: If the authority knows 
one demand parameter the other one has to be reported truthfully; in 
this case c =  c + — from (30). On the other hand, if c is known,
i.e. c =  c, then again from (30) we see that 2 =  a + p(n — l )^ p ^  anc ’̂ 




























































































B  C h oosin g  th e  m axim u m  d egree of collu­
sion
Here we calculate the profit-maximising degree of collusion that the firms 
can obtain if it is common knowledge that the demand and cost param­
eters lie below some fixed upper bounds. Then the firms have to solve 
the following optimisation problem:
Choose (p,q,a,b,c) to maximise individual profits n = (p — c)q 
given that price p and quantity q satisfy the demand equation, and p lies 
between the Cournot and the monopoly price:
p =  a — bnq, pc < p < pJ. (31)
The reports (a, 6, c) must be such that p and q appear as resulting from 
Cournot competition:
a + nc
and must lie within the bounds
(n +  1)6
(32)
a < a < an b < b <bn c < c < c/f. (33)
Using equations (31) and (32) we can substitute for q, b and c using
a —p -  . a  — p _ n +  1 1
q — — — 6 = 6------  c = - ------ p -----a,
nb a —p n n
(34)
thus eliminating these variables from the problem. Then, profits can be 
rewritten as
n =  (p — c) a — p 
nb
































































































a + c — 2p 
nb
> 0 if p < pJ
a + c 
2
Since profits are increasing in p as long as it is below the monopoly price, 
profit maximisation is equivalent to choosing the maximum price given 
the constraints (31), (32) and (33). Using equation (34), we can restate 




a + nc a + c (35)
71+1 2
a < a  < an (36)
~ (1>H ^
a + { T - ' ) t' - T a
(37)
— a +  (n +  1 )p < ncff. (38)
If at the optimum (35) is binding then p — pJ , and the bounds on a can 
be derived from (36), (37), and (38) with p = pJ (see figure illustrating 
case 1 in the text).
If (35) is not binding, then the firms cannot reach full collusion since 
some constraints on 2, 6, or c must be binding. In this case, the constraint 
(38) on c must be binding. Assume it does not: Since (35) is not binding 
we have p < pJ , and (at least) one of (36), (37) is binding. Obviously, p is 
then maximized for a — a, yielding p — a which contradicts p < pJ < a.
So assume that (38) is binding: c — cn- If in addition (36) is 
binding, then p = pa = and 2 =  <z„, 6 =  fe(n+"()° " ^ " )nCH, c =  cH
by solving (38) and (36) as equalities (see figure for case 2). If instead 
(37) is binding, we get p = pb = 2 =  j  =  ^
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Reported parameter values are 





























































































The bounds on the intercept 





























































































The bounds on the slope and 
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